Critical Analysis of Peter Singer’s Famine Affluence and Morality Essay

In his article Famine, Affluence and Morality Peter Singer gives a seemingly devastating critique of our prevalent ways of thinking about famine relief, charity, and morality in general. In spite of that very hardly a(prenominal) mountain have accepted, or at any rate acted on, the conclusions he reaches. In light of these facts wiz might diametriciate of Singers arguments, as Hume said of Berkeleys arguments for immaterialism, that they admit of no wait on and produce no conviction.1 While I do think that Singers considerations show that bulk should do considerably more than most people actually do, they do not establish his conclusions in their full strength or generality. So his arguments admit of a partial answer, and once properly serve may produce some conviction. In Famine. Affluence, and Morality, Peter Singer stresses the possible revisionary implications of accepting utilitarianism as a guide to conduct. He does not actually espouse utilitarianism in this essay, r ather a cousin of utilitarianism. He observes, in the world today, there are many people suffering a lot, leading low-pitched lives, on the margin, pr whizz to calamity whenever natural disasters or wars or other cataclysmic events strike. Many millions of people live on an income equivalent to one dollar a day or less. What, if any function, does morality say one should do about this?Singer proposes two principlesa stronger one he favors, a weaker one he offers as a fallback. The Strong Singer Principle If it is in our power to thwart something sorry from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, chastely, to do it. The Weak Singer Principle If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. Consider the Strong Singer Principle. He explains that by without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance I mean without causing anyth ing else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent. From the first principle it follows that whether one should attend those who are suffering or dying doesnt depend on how close one is to them, unless that makes helping them more difficult, because their distance from one does nothing to lessen their suffering. From both principlestogether, it follows that ones obligation to help those who are suffering or dying doesnt go away if other people who are also in a position to help them arent doing anything, because the presence of other people who do nothing is, in moral terms, no different from the absence of people who do something. Singer comments on this argument by adding that he could get by with a weaker version of the second principle, which would have something of moral significance in place of something of roughly catch moral importance (506). H e also gives a hypothetical example of the second principle in action If one is in a position to save a child drowning in a pond, one should rescue the child even though that means dirtying ones clothes, because that is not a morally significant cost and the childs death would be an extremely morally bad state of affairs (506).